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SINCE THE SLOWDOWN IN THE ECONOMY THAT BEGAN IN 1990,
RESEARCH HAS SHOWN THAT FIRMS’ SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN
THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE VARIES ACCORDING TO THEIR SIZE. THIS IS
THE MAIN CONCLUSION THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE STUDIES OF
THE PRODUCTIVE SECTOR PUBLISHED ANNUALLY BY THE BANQUE DE
FRANCE, AND FROM THE STUDY BY AUGORY, AVOUY-DOVI, BUSQUE
AND QUERON (1996) OF TRENDS IN THE MACROECONOMIC SITUATION
OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIAL FIRMS BETWEEN 1985 AND
1992.
“There is a clear distinction between small and medium-sized industrial firms and
large industrial firms in terms not only of output and investment but also of job creation
and/or destruction. In relation to the business cycle, the behaviour of small and medium-sized
industrial firms appears cyclical and similar to that of non-financial firms, while a certain
dissymmetry is apparent in large industrial firms’ reactions to the different stages of the cycle”
(Augory, Avouy-Dovi, Busque and Quéron, 1996, p.33).
Two sets of arguments may be advanced to explain the particular sensitivity of small
and medium-sized industrial firms. The first is based on real determinants: firms of this type
are more sensitive to cyclical shifts because their productive structures have less inertia and
are therefore more flexible. The second is based on financial determinants, within which two
particular approaches can be identified.
• Researchers seeking to identify the existence of a “credit channel” emphasise the
special position of small and medium-sized enterprises (Gertler, Gilchrist, 1993, 1994;
Hubbard, 1995). According to this view, SMEs bear the brunt of real or monetary shocks
affecting the economy because capital markets operate imperfectly. This research reveals the
emergence of a “flight to quality”, reflected by a reduction in the amount of bank lending to
SMEs (Oliner, Rudebusch, 1995). However, researchers have not managed to identify
whether this effect is due to changes in the behaviour of lenders or of borrowers.
• Researchers focusing specifically on SMEs point to the existence of a “small
business capital gap”, generally identified by two features (Garvin, 1971). First, the cost of
access to capital is higher for small businesses. Bardos (1991) has found this to be the case
for small French firms on the credit market. Second, small businesses are reputed to suffer
from a chronic shortage of long-term capital, whether in the form of share issues or bankBANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 3
loans. The corollary to this is high levels of short-term debt, which may explain why small
businesses are more sensitive to economic shocks. Tamari (1980) shows that this is a
permanent feature of the economic landscape of all the industrialised countries. Research
carried out by the Banque de France has underlined the importance of short-term debt for
small businesses (Beau, 1991; Boissonade, Tournier, 1996). An analysis of firms’ capital
structure according to size over the period 1990-1993 revealed significant differences in
financial behaviour, especially for firms with more than 2 000 employees (Cieply, Paranque,
1996). Firms with less than 2,000 employees carried more debt. Among these firms, which are
highly sensitive to the cost of borrowing, cash flow was a more important factor in obtaining
loans. Likewise, as debt is the sole source of capital, small firms (unlike large firms) are not
able to compensate for an increase in the working capital requirement or a fall in turnover by
borrowing more. Moreover, as their accumulation rate tends to be higher than that of large
firms, their financing requirements are correspondingly greater (Paranque, 1994, 1996). These
features have led some economists and politicians to argue that the financial system is biased
against small businesses and to justify the existence of financial institutions that specialise in
lending to them
2. To the best of our knowledge, however, no research has yet shown that
supply effects predominate over demand effects in determining the financial characteristics of
firms in general and small businesses in particular. It is this question that we seek to address
in this study, based on accounting and tax data collected by the Banque de France’s Balance
Sheet Data Centre
3.
In Section I we describe the theoretical determinants of a firm’s financial structure and
identify the various relationships that may be said to characterise the corporate borrowing
market.
In Section II we describe the specifications of the model used.
In Section III we identify supply and demand effects and explain our methodological
options in the light of the subject of our research and the data processing tools at our disposal.
In Section IV we describe the results of our research and compare them with other
indicators such as insolvency rates, Banque de France credit ratings, size and the existence of
financial links between firms.
In Section V we describe the economic and financial characteristics of firms according
to the form of credit rationing and raise some questions as to their situation with regard to
changes in the monetary environment.
1. THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRMS’ FINANCIAL
STRUCTURES AND THE NATURE OF CREDIT
RATIONING
1.1 A number of different determinants
A considerable amount of research into the determinants of firms’ financial structures
has been carried out since Modigliani and Miller (1958) advanced the idea that methods of
raising capital did not affect firms’ investment decisions. A distinction may be made between
two categories of research.
                                                  
2  This is the view taken by Bolton (1972), Wilson (1979) and Middleton et al. (1995) in the UK; by Garvin (1971)
in the USA; by Holmes, Kent (1991) in Australia; and, in France, by the Courbot report (1973) to the Economic
and Social Committee, the “Credit Risk” report (CNC, 1995) and, more recently, in the introduction by Lagayette
(1996) to the brochure describing the CDC’s initiatives in favour of small businesses.
3  See the description of samples in Annex 1.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 4
According to the theory of capital structure (Harris, Raviv, 1991), a firm’s financial
structure expresses the rational preference of its manager or managers in an environment
characterised both by the diverging interests of economic actors (managers, owners, manager-
owners and creditors) and by the existence of information asymmetries between these actors.
From this standpoint, the firm’s indebtedness is seen as a mechanism that limits conflicts
between the manager and the owners or between the owner-manager and the shareholders (if
any). This is because debt limits the volume of the firm’s idle resources (Jensen’s free cash
flow theory, 1986) and displaces the decision whether to continue operating outside the firm.
Debt is also a discipline because of the risk of default, limiting the incentive for managers to
consume the company’s cash flow themselves. Furthermore, it serves as an indicator of the
firm’s quality to outsiders (Ross, 1977) and thus makes it possible at least partially to solve
conflicts between the manager(s) and the shareholder(s). But firms cannot contract unlimited
amounts of debt. They have an incentive to limit the level of debt of their own accord, first
because of the emergence of conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and second because
there are other less costly ways of sending signals, such as dividend distribution policy. Within
this theoretical framework, the financial structure reflects the borrower’s strategy. The firm
seeks an optimal debt level in an environment characterised by information asymmetries. This
debt level corresponds to the firm’s expressed demand for debt.
According to the credit rationing theory
4, a firm’s financial structure reflects the
lenders’ strategy of maximising profits. Lenders’ and borrowers’ strategies converge only in
very exceptional cases. Situations can therefore exist in which demand for capital exceeds
supply. In their study of credit rationing,  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that the appearance
of such a situation on the credit market is due to phenomena of adverse selection
5 and moral
hazard
6 that do not allow changes in interest rates to restore the market equilibrium. Lenders,
being unable to influence price levels effectively, influence quantity instead and limit the
amount of credit rationally and independently of the regulatory context. Williamson (1986)
confirms the existence of credit rationing, though using rather different arguments. In
Williamson’s view, on a market where information is imperfect, lenders face opportunistic
behaviour by borrowers
7. Lenders seek to limit this behaviour by means of monitoring, but
they are not always able to do so in an economically viable manner. Once the costs of
monitoring exceed the expected benefits, lenders prefer to limit the supply of credit to firms.
Credit is said to be rationed because excess unsatisfied demand remains. For lenders, a firm’s
optimal debt level corresponds to its maximum debt capacity.
The optimal debt level according to the capital structure theory is not a priori equal to
the maximum debt level according to the credit rationing theory, inasmuch as the objectives of
lenders and borrowers do not coincide. Ultimately, therefore, a firm’s financial structure is not
determined by a single factor but may result, simultaneously or alternatively, from the
borrower’s strategy (capital structure theory) and/or from the lender’s strategy (credit
rationing theory). Ang and Peterson (1986) suggest eliminating this multiplicity of
determinants by representing the individual decisions of the lender and the borrower in a
disequilibrium model.
                                                  
4  For an exposition of this theory, see Levratto (1992).
5  Adverse selection results from the existence of information asymmetries before loans are contracted (ex ante
information asymmetries). It is difficult for lenders to discriminate between firms efficiently. Interest rates are not
good regulators on this market. A rise in interest rates causes the least risky borrowers to leave the market, so that
ultimately only the worst risks remain available to lenders on the credit market (Stiglitz, Weiss, 1981).
6  Moral hazard results from the existence of information asymmetries during the lifetime of a loan. Once a loan has
been granted, the borrower can choose a riskier project than the one on the basis of which the loan was obtained.
This leads to asset substitution, a phenomenon perfectly described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981).
7  Information asymmetries may show up ex post. In this case lenders are unable to make a precise evaluation of the
yield of the projects carried out by borrowers, who may understate their real income in order to minimise their
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1.2 The representation of the credit market in a
disequilibrium model
The representation of the credit market in a disequilibrium model has been the subject
of a number of macroeconomic studies (Levratto, 1992) which have sought to identify the
existence of credit rationing and to estimate the amount. Ang and Peterson (1986) apply this
approach to individual data in order to analyse the behaviour of 170 firms on the US credit
market in three specific years: 1971, 1974 and 1977. The aim of their research is to determine,
for each firm and at each date, the probability that the firm’s debt level corresponds to its own
optimisation strategy. The authors found first, that the capital structure theory, and hence
demand, played a greater role in determining debt rates across the entire sample
8; and second,
that pressures on the corporate bond market increased in 1974 and 1977.
Our approach, though drawing substantially on Ang and Peterson’s work, diverges
from it on two points.
First, in this study we consider firms’ overall debt behaviour, whatever the source of
the debt. The debt level thus includes both debt securities and bank debt, though other forms
of credit (commercial, fiscal, social, etc.) are excluded from the debt ratio under consideration.
Second, we consider both a firm’s demand for long-term debt and the supply of credit
available to it, unlike Ang and Peterson, who studied the supply of and demand for debt
securities by a single agent, the firm j, which may be both a lender and a borrower on the debt
market.
In our study, the credit market is described as follows.
– Lj
D is the debt level demanded by firm j at time t. Lj
D corresponds to firm j’s optimal
debt ratio. Lj
D allows firm j to maximise its value during the year t once the existence of
information asymmetries and agency conflicts have been taken into account. The vector x j
represents all the deteRmijants of the demand for financing. Supposing a linear relationship
between Lj
D and x j, then L   j
D
j j = + b m xj [1].
– Lj
S  is the debt level offered by the lender to firm j at time t. Lj
S corresponds to the
firm’s maximum debt capacity calculated by the lender. Lj
S  allows the bank to maximise its
profits from the firm. The vector y j represents the factors entering into the lender’s decision
to grant firm j a loan at time t. Supposing a linear relationship between Lj
S et y j, then




j j = + g w  [2].
– Lj
D is equal to Lj
S only in exceptional cases, when only the minimum of the
quantities offered and demanded are observed (Quandt, 1988). Consequently, equations [1]
and [2] are supplemented by the equation
 
L* Min L ,L j j
D
j
S = e j [3] where L* j is the debt level
of firm j at time t.
hen three configurations may be distinguished.
1.  If L* L L j j
D
j
S = = . The actual debt rate corresponds to both the optimal debt
rate determined by the firm and the firm’s maximum debt capacity determined by the lender.
                                                  
8  The debt rate used by the authors is the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 6
2. If L* L j j
D = , the debt rate is the optimal debt rate determined by the firm. The
firm’s financial structure is thus defined by demand. Lj
S is greater thanLj
D and consequently
there is more credit available to the firm from lenders than the firm demands. Firms with these
characteristics may be said to be in a situation of credit rationing by demand inasmuch as
their financial structures are determined by the demand side of the market, ie, the borrowers.
3. IfL* L j j
S = , the debt rate is the firm’s maximum debt capacity as determined
by the lender. Lj
S is less than Lj
D. There is unsatisfied demand for credit from the firm on the
market. Firms with these characteristics may be said to be in a situation of credit rationing by
supply inasmuch as their financial structures are determined by the supply side of the market,
ie, the lenders.
The last two situations therefore correspond to situations of disequilibrium on the
credit market. The possible configurations of the credit market are shown in the following
table:
Credit configuration Nature of constraint
Equilibrium L L L jt jt
D
jt
S * = = Equilibrium ###
Disequilibrium I L L jt jt




Disequilibrium II L L jt jt




1.3 The notion of credit rationing
Although our approach is taken within the framework of an equilibrium rationing
approach (Levratto, 1992), the terminology of credit rationing needs to be used with care. It is
relatively easy to justify the assumption that firms seek an optimal debt rate (though not so
easy to calculate that rate). It is more difficult to estimate the relevance of maximum debt
capacity without information about the lenders, as is the case when working solely with
corporate accounting data. The optimal debt rate is the rate which makes it possible to
maximise the firm’s value, if it is listed, or its financial profitability through leverage, if it is
not listed. In the latter case, the optimal debt rate is a factor in maximising profit. The
definition of maximum debt capacity, on the other hand, is constrained by supply, since it
includes the lender’s profitability imperatives alongside the relationship between banks and
firms. However, we determine its function on the basis of the assessment of the borrower’s
economic and financial situation that the lender might make on the basis of his own
constraints, which we do not know. In other words, credit rationing by supply is difficult to
identify in the absence of information on the lender’s own financial situation and his own
methods for assessing the borrower. Likewise, including in the case of credit ratioining by
demand, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the optimal debt level pursued by the firm
already incorporates the state of the final market (real demand) and of the credit market. The
firm might have internalised the rationing of credit (the maximum debt capacity determined by
the lender), which would mean abandoning projects for which the optimal debt level was
higher than the maximum level defined by the lender. The projects selected would thus be
those for which capital could be raised under market conditions. In this context, credit
rationing is a relative concept. In conditions of credit rationing by demand, a firm might notBANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 7
have expressed part of its demand because of its perception of the conditions of supply. It is
for that reason that we have sought to construct a notional demand for and supply of capital
by introducing indicators relating to the agent’s environment (economic activity for firms,
monetary environment for lenders) alongside the indicators suggested by information theory.
2. THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF CREDIT
The dependent variable chosen in this study is the debt rate, which provides a synthetic
representation of the firm’s financial structure. Like all our ratios, it is calculated according to
the Banque de France’s methods of financial analysis. Consisting of the ratio of long-term
debt plus short-term borrowings to invested capital (BK7)
9, it is an indicator of the firm’s
total debt.
2.1 Individual demand for credit: the firm’s choice of an
optimal debt structure
In this section we shall identify the factors that encourage firms to contract debt and
the factors that encourage them to limit their financial dependence of their own accord. We
shall also take into account the firm’s financial environment likely to reflect its sensitivity to
lenders’ constraints. Ratios are chosen by trying to identify the “cognitive process or
processes on the basis of which agents determine their financing requirements and capacity”
(Levratto, 1992, p.37) or make their decisions whether or not to grant loans.
2.1.1 Factors that encourage firms to contract debt
Firms seek to contract debt in two cases.
First, when firms perceive an improvement in their prospects they anticipate an
increase in their financing requirement, which leads to an increase in their debt. This factor
may be materialised by the turnover variation rate (BM1).
The credit demand function also includes an indicator relating to the firm’s financial
environment, which enters into agents’ expectations of future activity. Bernanke (1990) and
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have shown that the interest rate spread contains information
about future activity. Rational agents’ expectations of a positive shock on real activity is
reflected in an increase in the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates. We have
used the spread between the overnight rate and the long-term rate to materialise this link
between debt and real activity. The firm’s demand for credit is a negative function of the
overnight rate minus long-term rate spread (or a positive function of the long-term minus
overnight rate spread)
10.
Second, when a firm wishes to issue new shares or needs to bring in outside
shareholders, which is typically the case when small businesses are expanding, debt is a way
of both imposing discipline and sending signals. Indebtedness is therefore a positive function
of the problems it solves.
                                                  
9  Invested capital consists of internal financing (shareholders’ equity + accumulated depreciation + reserves) plus
financial debt (including discounted bills, commercial paper and leasing). In an earlier study (Paranque, Cieply,
1996) we showed that the following debt ratios moved in parallel:
- external contributions (loans + short-term bank borrowings + group and shareholder loans) to invested capital,
- external contributions rate,
- debt to invested capital,
- debt rate.
10 Statistics compiled and made available by the Monetary and Economic Series department of the Banque de France.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 8
In the literature on the subject, the problem of disincentives to optimal investment
11 is
assumed to be particularly acute among firms with strong growth opportunities which may
either embark on over-risky projects or choose not to exercise a growth option. Ang and
Peterson use an indicator of the degree of rigidity of the productive system, which can be
approximated by the ratio of plant and equipment to invested capital (BM7) : if it is low,
the firm might need to increase its productive potential. Titman and Wessels (1988) use the
ratio of total asset growth to total assets, materialised by the extended accumulation rate
12
(BB5) as proxie for firms’ growth opportunities.
These two ratios are intended to express the firm’s capacity to take advantage of
growth opportunities and are likely to indicate a risk of under-optimal investment.
2.1.2 Factors that encourage firms to reduce their demand for credit
A firm may be encouraged to limit its recourse to debt of its own accord for several
reasons.
First, the firm may wish to indicate its self-discipline. The firm’s manager has an
alternative to debt in order to solve the agency problems he encounters in his relations with
shareholders: he can send them a signal through his dividend policy. The message is generally
considered to be effective because it cannot easily be imitated by a poor firm which does not
have the necessary cash flow to pay dividends
13. The idea is that dividends are a signal of the
firm’s future cash flow in a context of information asymmetries. Outside investors, assuming
them to have rational expectations, can anticipate a firm’s future results. Information
asymmetries are reduced as a consequence. Dividend announcements are thus perceived as
good news by potential shareholders. For listed shares, dividend distributions are reflected in a
rise in the share price. Dividend policy thus replaces debt policy as an indicator of the firm’s
quality. Indebtedness is thus a decreasing function of dividend distribution, materialised by the
ratio of dividends to shareholders’ equity (BB12).
Second, the managers and/or shareholders may, of their own accord, wish to reduce
the risk of bankruptcy because of the costs they would have to bear. Controlling this risk
involves demonstrating the economic viability of projects and presenting guarantees, but it
also means agreeing to let the lender monitor the firm more closely or demand a risk premium,
the cost of which may ultimately be passed on to the cost of borrowing proposed to the firm.
• The level of insolvency risk is materialised by the ratio of interest charges to
overall cash flow (BM11) and of working capital requirement to invested capital
(BM4)
14.
• The cost of borrowing indicator is the average cost of borrowing (BT2) borne by
the firm for both long-term loans and short-term borrowings, expressed by the ratio
of interest charges to debt.
In order to manage all the constraints mentioned above, the firm may prefer to finance
itself from cash flow (Myers, 1984 and Myers, Maljuf, 1984). A preference for self-financing
is one of the precepts of hierarchical financing theory. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest
using profitability to take this factor into account, since profitability is an indicator of the
availability of internal financing. We have used the ratio of net self-financing capacity to
                                                  
11 This policy of under-optimal investment is based either on a strategy of underinvestment linked in particular to the
entrepreneur’s personal use of assets to the detriment of the firm (Jensen, Meckling, 1976), or on a strategy of
overinvestment linked to excessive risk-taking by the borrower in projects of uncertain profitability which risk
causing a substantial discounting of the firm’s shares (Jensen, 1986).
12 The ratio of total investment plus variation in working capital requirement to invested capital.
13 Quintart and Zisswiller (1985) and Cobbaut (1991) provide a review of the literature on the subject.
14 These ratios are particularly relevant for the detection of insolvency (Bardos, 1991).BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 9
internal financing (BB11) as a proxy for profitability, since it is an estimation of net financial
profitability for the shareholder before dividends. This ratio may be expected to dampen the
firm’s demand for debt.
Public offerings of shares are also an alternative source of financing that may dampen
demand for debt among firms that are able to consider them. This factor is materialised by the
ratio of net increase in capital to invested capital (BJ4), which may also be expected to have
a negative influence on indebtedness.
The ratios included in the credit demand function are shown in the table below.
Table 1
FIRMS’ DEMAND FOR CREDIT IN INFORMATION THEORY:
CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVE ACCOUNTING VARIABLES *
Ratios










BM7 Plant and equipment to invested capital x
BB5 Extended accumulation rate x
BM1 Turnover variation rate x
BB12 Dividends to shareholders’ equity (rate of
shareholder remuneration)
BT2 Average cost of borrowing x
BM11 Interest charges to overall cash flow x
BM4 Working capital requirement to invested
capital x
BB11 Net self-financing capacity  to internal
financing (net financial profitability) x
BJ4 Net increase in capital to invested capital x
Spread Overnight rate to 10-year govt. bond rate x
* the sign expresses the influence of the ratio on demand for debt.
2.2 Individual supply of credit: the exogenous limits on
a firm’s debt
A firm’s debt policy may be limited by the profit maximisation strategies of lenders in
general and banks in particular. Whereas in the previous case firms set their own limits on
debt, credit rationing theory says that lenders may limit their offer of financing to firms, which
then show a lower level of debt than their desired level ex ante. However, lenders and agents
can deploy screening, monitoring and signalling devices that help to reduce credit rationing.
The capital supply model includes an environmental factor that is intended to set an exogenous
limit on lenders’ capacity to distribute credit.
2.2.1 Factors limiting a lender’s supply of credit
Lenders regularly monitor the activity of borrowers in order to pick up any early signs
of future insolvency risk. The turnover variation rate (BM1) is an indicator of trends on the
firm’s markets and of the pressures that are liable to feed through into financing requirements.
The ratio of working capital requirement to invested capital (BM4) materialises the risk of
financial distress and the ratio of annual loan repayments to overall cash flow (BB7) shows
the importance of repayment of the firm. A negative link may be expected between these ratios
and the supply of credit.
Banks also limit their supply of credit if the borrower displays a significant level of
moral hazard or opportunism, ie, if the firm’s investment policy is less than optimal from the
lender’s point of view. This risk is materialised by the ratio, used earlier, of productive plantBANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 10
and equipment to invested capital (BM7) and the turnover variation rate (BM1). The
lender’s risk limitation strategy may then conflict with the firm’s debt strategy.
2.2.2 Factors favouring a lender’s supply of credit
Faced with this divergence of interests lenders and borrowers, rather than doing
nothing, deploy screening and monitoring devices (for lenders) and signalling devices (for
firms).
2.2.2.1 Action by lenders
Lenders, and banks in particular, screen applicants for loans by offering them
various combinations of interest rates and guarantees (Bester, 1985). Firms thus have access
to credit under different conditions that reveal the banks’ assessment of their situation. Firms
offered credit at high rates of interest but with low levels of guarantee may be regarded as
high-risk. Conversely, those offered credit at low rates of interest but with high levels of
guarantee may be regarded as low-risk. They are able to provide substantial guarantees in
return for lower interest rates or the ability to negotiate the combination of interest rates and
guarantees. These factors are materialised in our model by the cost of debt (BT2) and, as
indicators of the level of guarantees that borrowers may provide to the lender, the two ratios of
participating interests to invested capital (BJ3) and plant and equipment to invested
capital (BM7). These ratios are assumed to have opposite signs in the supply function.
2.2.2.2 Action by borrowers
Firms do not remain passive when faced with information asymmetries. They send
signals to lenders which may transmit different messages. Managers may signal a firm’s
quality by taking an equity interest in it, a form of financial commitment that excludes loans
and advances (Leland, Pyle, 1977), but this information is not available. Firms may also
signal their capacity to generate profits and cash. The ratio of self-financing to internal
financing (BB10) is an indicator of a firm’s capacity to repay since it measures the firm’s
gross profitability after payment of dividends. Dividend policy may also be a significant
element of information. The ratio of dividends to shareholders’ equity (BB12) reflects the
level of shareholder remuneration and the firm’s capacity if necessary to raise new equity, ie,
to consolidate its financial position. Conversely, when a firm is controlled by its managers this
ratio is also an indicator of the extent to which they draw on the firm’s profits in order to
increase their level of personal satisfaction, albeit perhaps to the detriment of the firm’s level
of utility. Lastly, the existence of links between the borrower and another source of capital,
better informed than the lender under consideration, also gives the lender a signal as to the
quality of the firm (Cieply, 1995; Hancké, Cieply, 1996). Group or shareholder loans (BT4)
may, via the firm’s balance sheet, transmit this information from a well-informed lender to a
less well-informed one. The same goes for net increase in capital(BJ4), though with a caveat
according to the type of lender. A capital increase may be seen either as a sign of confidence
in the quality of planned investments (good news) or as a sign that shareholders are looking to
share the risks with newcomers (bad news).
2.2.3 Influence of the financial environment on the lender’s supply of
credit
The model includes an indicator of lenders’ refinancing conditions, intended to
materialise the financial constraints upon them. For the supply of credit as a whole we have
used the overnight rate (Tjj), which is the current price of a credit institution’s financial
resources. The sign of the link between the overnight rate and the supply of credit is expected
to be jeeaTiVe* AS the cost of refinancing rises, screening becomes tougher and the supply of
credit is reduced.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 11
To sum up, the ratios used in the model are as follows:
Table 2
THE LENDER’S SUPPLY OF CREDIT IN INFORMATION THEORY:
CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVE ACCOUNTING VARIABLES








BB7 Debt burden x
BM7 Plant and equipment to invested
capital x x
BJ3 Participating interests to invested
capital x
BT2 Average cost of debt x
BM1 Turnover variation rate x x x
BM4 Working capital requirement to
invested capital x
BB10 Self-financing to internal
financing (gross financial
profitability) x
BB12 Dividends to shareholders’ equity
(rate of shareholder
remuneration) x
BJ4 Net increase in capital to invested
capital x
Tjj Overnight rate x
BT4 Group and shareholder loans to
external financing x
*
*         *
Each variable is thus an indicator of the firm’s financing policy which, combined with
other indicators, will enable us to define whether credit is rationed by demand or by supply.
The aim is not to study the sign of the coefficient resulting from regressions but to grasp a
firm’s economic and financial situation from its debt level (and not the variation in its debt
level), with the help of indicators that are likely to shed light on the factors that determine
whether credit is rationed by demand or by supply.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 12
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND THEIR LABELS  
15
XD = {1, BM1, BM4, BM7, BB12, BT2, BJ4, BM11, BB11, BB5, ECTAUX} optimal debt rate
XO = {1, BM1, BM4, BM7, BB12, BT2, BJ4, BJ3, BB7, BB10, BT4, TAJJ} maximum debt rate
Where:
BB7 Debt burden (interest charges + annual loan repayments / overall cash flow)
BM1 Turnover variation rate
BM4  Working capital requirement / invested capital
BB11 Net self-financing capacity / internal financing
BM7 Plant and equipment / invested capital
BB12 Dividends / shareholders’ equity
BB5 Extended accumulation rate 
16
BT2 Average cost of debt
BB10 Self-financing / internal financing
BT4 Group and shareholder loans / external financing
BJ3 Participating interests / invested capital
BJ4 Net increase in capital / invested capital
BM11 Interest charges / overall cash flow
TAJJ Annualised overnight rate 
17
ECTAUX Spread between overnight rate and  10-year government bond rate
3. THE METHOD
The purpose of this research is first, to try and identify which of the three
configurations described above (credit rationing by demand, equilibrium, credit rationing by
supply) is most prevalent on the French credit market, and second, to identify the proportion
of small firms in the category of firms subject to credit rationing by supply. The aim is to
discover whether small firms are over-represented in that category, which would confirm the
existence of a small business capital gap.
We have taken a three-stage approach to this question.
First, the debt rate is regressed on the offer vector and on the demand vector
18 and we
compare the overall quality of each regression.
Second, after two regressions we obtain an estimated value that lies within 5% of the
actual value. For the supply function, we estimate maximum debt capacity. For the demand
function, we estimate the optimal debt rate. In order to determine which side of the line a firm
falls, we compare the two estimated values according to the corresponding functions. If, for a
given firm, the estimated optimal debt rate is lower than the estimated maximum debt
capacity, credit is assumed to be rationed by demand. Credit is assumed to be rationed by
supply if the opposite is the case and to be in equilibrium when there is no statistical
difference between the estimated values. The dominant situation at each date is determined by
comparing the proportion of firms in each of the three configurations.
Third, the hypothesis that small firms are subject to greater credit rationing is tested
by measuring the frequency of each size of firm in the credit rationing by supply configuration
                                                  
15 The debt rate in each case is a function of variables. In other words, each vector uses the effects of links between
variables and not the variable per se, in isolation. The sense or meaning derives from the combination of variables:
they constitute a “system”.
16 Total investment + variation in working capital requirement to invested capital
17 The overnight rate is the annual rolling average of the month-to-month overnight rate: like the spread, it is assigned
to each firm at its value at the date of the firm’s accounts closing.
18 We use the PROC REG procedure available under SAS and evaluate this quality using adjusted R squared.
Multicolinearity and homoskedasticity are tested using the SPEC, VIF and COLLINOINT options.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 13
(contribution of these firms to the chi-squared of the configuration) in order to see whether
small firms are over-represented.
The use of the least squares method is open to criticism. Quandt (1988) has shown
that the method could produce biased results, because of the existence of a conditional link
between the regression carried out and the configuration postulated a priori. This conditional
link may indeed lead to a correlation between the error and the explanatory variables, which
breaches one of the assumptions of the least squares method.
In view of these criticisms, Quandt (1988) recommends using the maximum likelihood
method to identify the form of credit rationing, if any. However, it is not sufficient merely to
replace the least squares method with the maximum likelihood method, which would do
nothing to solve the problem of the conditional link. Rather, we have sought to optimise a
likelihood function including the two functions under consideration and all the possible
segmentations of the sample. This enables us to eliminate the conditional link between the
results and the assumed domination of one particular configuration. However, applying this
method is a complex business (Legendre, Mihoubt, 1990) since all possible segmentations of
the sample need to be tested.
Given the computational difficulties and the fact that there is no available software for
applying the maximum likelihood method to continuous individual data, we have decided for
the time being to take an approach based on the least squares method. In order to verify that
there are no contradictions and to judge the relevance of the identified credit configuration, we
cross the results with two indicators constructed independently of the supply of credit. These
two indicators are the Banque de France credit rating
19 and the incidence of insolvency,
bankruptcy, involuntary liquidation or court-supervised rehabilitation proceedings in the year
for which the credit configuration is determined. Banque de France credit ratings are assigned
after an interview with the chief executive and are based both on accounting data and on
qualitative information about the firm’s economic situation and growth prospects. Insolvency
is often due to a cash shortage or cash flow crisis or to the loss of a major customer. The
likelihood of occurrence rises when firms have high levels of debt and hence also of debt
service.
                                                  
19 The credit rating is assigned after an interview between the firm’s chief executive or his representative and the
director of the branch of the Banque de France on which the company depends. Leaving aside qualitative factors, a
3 credit rating is assigned to a company that meets the following conditions:
- the firm’s financial position and profitability, assessed in the light of recent financial statements, warrant a
favourable opinion,
- the managers, shareholders and affiliates or firms with which the company concerned has close links give no
grounds for special attention or reservations,
- payments are made at sufficiently regular intervals not to warrant any change in the payment rating.
A 3 credit rating is particularly important to all those for whom it is intended, especially institutions governed by the
Banking Act, since franc-denominated loans with a maximum residual maturity of two years that such institutions
grant to firms with a 3 rating are eligible for Banque de France intervention on the money markets.
A 4 credit rating is assigned to firms for which the Banque de France is in possession of recent financial statements
and whose situation warrants special attention.
A 5 credit rating is assigned to firms whose situation warrants reservations, or after the appointment of a temporary
administrator for example.
A 6 credit rating is assigned to firms whose situation warrants serious reservations.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 14
4. THE PROPORTION OF FIRMS SUBJECT TO CREDIT
RATIONING BY SUPPLY HAS BEEN STABLE SINCE
1985
4.1 Credit rationing by demand is more frequent
Initial results of regressions carried out on the debt rate according to what we have
termed the demand and supply functions show that over the last ten years the proportion of
industrial firms in the credit rationing by demand configuration has been higher than the
proportion of firms in the credit rationing by supply configuration. The adjusted R-squared of
the demand function
20 is continuously higher. Thus, for a relatively stable proportion of firms,
the supply of credit seems to be rationed by demand in a constant fashion
21.
The proportion of firms subject to credit rationing by supply never falls below 38% of
the sample (1993) and may rise to over 40% (1994). Taking as an indicator the ratio of loans
to invested capital (BK9), which is an indicator of a firm’s long-term debt, the proportion of
firms subject to credit rationing by supply falls and the proportion of firms in equilibrium
rises. This result appears to be consistent over the long term
22.













1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199
1
1992 1993 1994 1995
Demande Offre Équilibre
Source and chart:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
                                                  
20 See Annex 2.
21 The nature of this constraint remains to be determined, however, especially if ultimately it does not also reflect
greater screening by lenders of the investment projects submitted to them.
22 For the supply of long-term credit we have used the spread between Tjj and TMBO.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 15
PROPORTION OF FIRMS BY CREDIT CONFIGURATION
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Demande Offre Équilibre
Source and chart:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
CREDIT CONFIGURATION ACCORDING TO DEBT INDICATOR *
Credit status
%
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Demand 40,8 44,3 55,4 50,3 51,1 53,0 55,8 59,1 65,0 60,1 55,9
(1) (44,725) (18,938) (142,4) (96,878) (219,52) (226,27) (192,78) (431,44) (462,56) (278,47) (222,21)
Supply 41,3 43,4 44,9 47,6 47,5 50,4 50,6 51,6 53,0 47,8 48,2
(2) (378,18) (430,65) (588,35) (514,24) (736,36) (854,36) (811,94) (1 147,1) (1 158,1) (924,53) (946,64)
Equilibrium 50,4 49,1 37,7 37,2 42,2 38,1 31,9 40,2 36,3 33,5 40,1
(3) (10,883) (5,5924) (13,935) (24,203) (22,27) (21,038) (13,427) (46,754) (52,738) (22,673) (48,874)
Chi-squared 822,920 1 036,063 1 422,374 1 233,446 1 841,549 2 080,737 1 964,494 2 962,908 3 051,44 2 335,21 2 311,82
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
* Proportion of firms by credit configuration according to debt rate (BK7) in the same configuration according to the long-term debt
rate (BK9). The figure in brackets is the contribution of each one to the chi-squared of the whole. Percentage in relation to the
total number of firms having the credit configuration defined according to the long-term debt rate.
Interpretation: in 1985, 40.8% of firms in the credit rationing by demand configuration were also in the same position as regards
the long-term debt rate.
The proportion of firms subject to credit rationing by supply as regards both total debt
and long-term debt increases steadily over the review period, rising from 41.3% in 1985 to
48.2% in 1995 and peaking at 53%  in 1993. At the same time, the proportion of firms in the
credit rationing by demand configuration according to both indicators also increases, while the
proportion of firms in equilibrium falls until 1989 and then fluctuates considerably until 1995.
In view of the credit rationing to which some firms may have been subject, it would be
instructive to be able to determine, for those firms which were not subject to credit rationing,
whether this was a result of an independent choice, ie, as an expression of their own
objectives, or whether, perceiving and/or anticipating such rationing, they changed their
strategy and hence their optimum debt level. Unfortunately, the lack of any qualitative data on
such behaviour means that we cannot explore the question in more depth.
STABILITY OF THE PROPORTION OF FIRMS SUBJECT TO CREDIT RATIONING BY SUPPLY IN 1995
(percentage) Subject to credit rationing by supply in 1995BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 16
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Present 51,9 58,2 65,0 71,2 75,4 89,4
Demand 30,7 27,5 26,3 24,5 21,3 14,3
Supply 54,4 55,8 58,0 61,2 65,6 70,6
Equilibrium 37,8 41,2 39,3 39,0 39,3 37,5
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update November 1996
Interpretation: 54.4 % of firms subject to credit rationing by supply in 1989 were also subject to credit rationing by supply in 1995.
Over half of the firms that were subject to credit rationing by supply in 1995 had
already been in that position at least once since 1989. More than a third had been in
equilibrium at least once. Of the 10% of firms present in 1995 since 1989, 36.2% had been
continuously subject to credit rationing by supply and 45.5% had continuously been in the
demand configuration. More specifically, 81.2% of firms in the credit rationing by supply
configuration in 1995 had been in that situation from 1989 to 1994.
A similar level of stability is found with firms in the demand configuration, but not
with firms in a state of equilibrium.
4.2 A firm’s credit configuration appears to be
consistent with the appearance of difficulties and its
credit rating
The relevance of a firm’s credit configuration is highlighted when the configuration is
compared with a variable indicating difficulties (insolvency) during the year after the year
under consideration 
23. A firm with a high level of debt may be assumed to be exposed to a
higher risk of insolvency, because it is especially sensitive to a cash shortage or cash-flow
crisis or the effects of a decline in activity. Insolvency is thus an assessment of the risk that
expectations will not be fulfilled and hence of the restriction on the firm’s ability to meet its
commitments.
CREDIT RATIONING BY SUPPLY AND INSOLVENCY IN N + 1 *
Credit rationing by supply 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Frequency of insolvent firms 40,7* 41,8 44,4 41,0 44,0 41,7 45,7 46,9 52,2 56,8 55,2
in the configuration (a) (2,874/ (5,338/ (10,707/ (2,728/ (9,201/ (9,575/ (25,789/ (32,177/ (33,364/ (26,624/ (10,24/
1,322) 1,5479) 5,6197) 1,401) 4,887) 3,0818) 13,521) 16,175) 19,103) 12,297) 5,5609)
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
* Frequency higher than the observed frequency across the entire sample
(a) The figures in brackets are the total chi-squared and contribution to the sub-population
Interpretation: 40.7% of insolvent firms in 1986 were subject to credit rationing in 1985.
From 1993-94, there is some loss of quality in the identification of insolvent firms,
linked to the preparation of the corresponding files in 1996. Given the length of bankruptcy
and liquidation procedures coupled with publication times and the time it takes to compile the
samples for review, some fall-off in quality is more or less inevitable towards the end of the
review period. However, this bias does not call into question the conclusions that may be
drawn regarding the proportion of insolvent firms that were subject to credit rationing in the
previous year.
Insolvency levels in the year n + 1 provide a fairly good reflection of cyclical
fluctuations in year n. Thus, insolvency levels rose after the stock market crash of 1987, at the
end of the growth cycle and the beginning of the slowdown in the economy in 1989 and 1991
                                                  
23 We are grateful to Mireille Bardos who gave us these informations.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 17
and following the recession in 1993. There is a particularly strong link between credit
rationing by supply, ie, a situation where the lender deems the debt rate to be at its maximum,
and the appearance of difficulties in the following year.
The robustness of the credit configuration indicator is further borne out by the credit
rating of firms as at February 1996. In 1995, firms subject to credit rationing were less
frequently rated 3 (35.5%, whereas they accounted for 39.9% of the sample), but firms with
more than 100 employees were more frequently rated 3 than smaller firms (this corresponds to
the overall hierarchy). Thus, the size effect persists within each configuration. In contrast,
firms in the credit rationing by demand configuration are more frequently rated 3 (49.7%,
whereas they accounted for 45.4% of the sample). The credit rating of firms in equilibrium
was distributed evenly in line with the proportion of the total sample that they represent
(14.7%).
4.3 Very small and, above all, large firms seem to be
more frequently subject to credit rationing
This general finding can be refined by analysing firms’ credit configuration according
to size. The following tables show the proportion of firms subject to credit rationing by size,
first according to the total debt rate, then according to the long-term debt rate.
PROPORTION OF FIRMS BY SIZE 




All £ 20 employees 21 - 100 101 - 500 501 - 2 000 > 2 000
1985 38,2 * 47,2** 37,5 35,6 35,0 44,0
(56,968) (18,591) (0,3666) (3,3121) (1,4017) (1,2476)
1986 39,7 48,2 38,2 37,7 37,7 52,6
(67,51) (21,036) (2,2562) (2,1828) (0,5457) (5,6228)
1987 39,7 45,2 38,0 39,0 41,5 52,0
(58,003) (10,029) (3,5844) (0,2991) (0,4352) (4,7852)
1988 38,9 42,9 36,7 39,2 41,4 58,6
(65,463) (6,6417) (6,1097) (0,0635) (0,9305) (13,443)
1989 39,9 41,1 38,6 40,6 42,4 57,6
(55,521) (0,6231) (2,5414) (0,3496) (0,9139) (9,8056)
1990 38,5 41,8 36,1 39,0 48,1 54,4
(77,055) (5,5442) (9,5403) (0,1747) (13,898) (7,4278)
1991 38,7 40,7 36,5 38,9 48,5 62,0
(82,700) (2,4671) (7,7488) (0,0635) (15,548) (15,278)
1992 38,2 39,3 37,6 37,0 43,1 55,6
(41,911) (0,7998) (0,6935) (1,1379) (3,9596) (8,4985)
1993 38,1 42,6 36,9 37,6 45,1 59,8
(71,348) (9,1374) (5,9102) (0,9875) (5,7413) (12,157)
1994 40,6 43,4 38,1 42,4 46,9 57,0
(82,799) (5,562) (11,356) (2,1338) (5,2569) (7,0686)
1995 39,9 41,8 37,0 42,0 52,9 58,4
(125,986) (2,259) (13,687) (2,9902) (21,899) (8,6272)
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92  56 58 Last update October 1996
* The figure in brackets is the chi-squared, significantly different from zero at the 5% threshold.
** Underlining indicates significant frequency (contribution to chi-squared) of size (larger or smaller) in relation to the frequency of
all firms in the sample having that credit status. The likelihood of a firm having a particular credit configuration was checked by
comparing the adjusted value of R-squared for a given size according to credit configuration and for a given configuration according
to size.
A significant link between credit configuration and size emerges over the review
period. Certain categories of firm appear to be more often subject to credit rationing than
others. These categories are very small businesses (20 employees or less), except in 1989,
1992 and 1995, very large firms (over 2,000 employees) and, from 1990, large firms (500 to
                                                  
24 The results for the class £ 20 employees should be treated with caution in view of the low coverage rate for this
category of firms (approx. 8%).BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 18
2,000 employees). Moreover, a majority of firms with over 2,000 employees are subject to
credit rationing, unlike small businesses. We may assume, therefore:
– that very small business have a problem of access to capital and that lenders find it
difficult to judge their growth prospects. The rationing thus stems mainly from the banks;
– that very large firms are more sensitive to developments on financial markets and to
investors’ expectations. This may, in a rather specific form, reflect the gap between the world
of industry and the world of finance and hence suggest a latent risk of under-optimal
investment. From 1990 in particular, the economic slowdown had an adverse effect on
investors’ expectations. The rationing thus stems mainly from the markets.
This finding may come as a surprise, given that the debt rate of very large firms is on
average lower than that of smaller firms. This apparent contradiction is resolved when it is
remembered that our configurations are notional (ie, virtual) ones. In other words, very large
firms can (or could) be more frequently subject to credit rationing even though their debt rate
is lower than that of smaller firms with the same configuration and higher than that of similar
firms having a different configuration. Thus, the same hierarchy by size exists within each
configuration.
PROPORTION OF FIRMS BY SIZE SUBJECT TO CREDIT RATIONING AS REGARDS LONG-TERM DEBT
(Debt excluding bank overdrafts)
size
year
All £ 20 employees 21 - 100 101 - 500 501 - 2 000 > 2 000
1985 22,6 38,1** 24,3 14,9 16,2 19,9
(238,248) (92,105) (3,8) (49,231) (9,7) (0,4588)
1986 25,1 41,1 25,6 17,3 20,2 29,3
(259,493) (118,07) (0,437) (57,369) (5,6169) (0,9314)
1987 24,8 39,1 24,6 17,7 22,1 31,5
(219,212) (109,1) (0,0631) (49,835) (1,5978) (2,3101)
1988 28,4 38,4 28,3 23,1 25,5 29,6
(120,283) (55,087) (0,0036) (25,87) (1,6845) (0,0758)
1989 26,5 34,9 25,6 22,7 26,6 36,0
(104,043) (46,761) (1,9541) (15,412) (0,0025) (4,2286)
1990 27,7 34,3 26,5 24,4 33,7 32,5
(86,533) (31,747) (3,583) (11,4) (7,6093) (0,9205)
1991 28,7 35,8 27,2 24,9 36,4 30,6
(105,598) (40,143) (5,6594) (14,645) (12,947) (0,1278)
1992 26,7 34,3 25,0 22,5 31,3 33,3
(136,041) (55,409) (6,9177) (18,659) (5,0452) (1,7959)
1993 27,1 35,5 25,5 21,8 31,1 33,6
(145,318) (65,396) (6,3074) (26,695) (3,2468) (1,6714)
1994 26,6 34,4 24,0 23,7 31,3 36,5
(143,889) (67,537) (18,493) (8,8975) (4,5071) (3,8735)
1995 26,1 32,4 24,0 23,7 31,3 35,6
(100,915) (38,785) (11,184) (5,5151) (5,3787) (3,5073)
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92  56 58 Last update October 1996
As regards the long-term debt rate, only very small firms are more frequently subject
to credit rationing. The existence of a small business capital gap thus seems to be confirmed
for long-term debt for this category of firm. The distribution of very large firms is more or less
even according to credit configuration, the proportion subject to rationing being between 20
and 30 points less (depending on the year) in relation to the result calculated according to the
total debt rate. This variation according to the indicator used is apparent for all sizes of firms
but the amplitude is less great. Moreover, whereas for very large firms the direction of the
movement is from credit rationing by supply towards equilibrium or credit rationing by
demand, for the other categories the relative proportion of firms in equilibrium increases.
These results are reasonably consistent with the underlying pattern predicted by
theory, since in a context of globalisation large firms offer more credible long-term growth
prospects than other firms. Furthermore, the fact that smaller firms generally obtain financingBANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 19
through intermediaries encourages them to optimise their financial structure in line with their
financial and economic environment.
Firms with between 21 and 500 employees, and in particular those with between 21
and 100 employees, are less frequently in the demand configuration. This result is also found
with reference to the long-term debt rate, though with less intensity at the top end of the range
of firms in the category. This could confirm the idea of a hierarchy in financing, with such
firms preferring to meet their financing requirement out of their own resources before
contracting debt.
4.4 Credit rationing appears to be tighter when financial
links exist
In 1995, according to the survey carried out in 1996, approximately 70% of
manufacturing firms in the sample had financial links with each other
25 and 2% were listed on
the stock exchange
26. Of the companies having financial links, only 2.8% were listed (though
96.3% of listed companies had financial links).
FINANCIAL LINKS AND SIZE
(percentage) 1995
(*) All £ 20 20-100 101-500 501-2000 >2000
























Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
(*) In relation to the total. The figure in brackets is the chi-squared (significant at the 5% threshold) or the contribution to chi-
squared.
Interpretation: 69.2% of firms have financial links; this proportion is 47.5% for  firms with 20 employees or less.
The frequency of financial links increases with size, with a significant break occurring
at the 100 employee threshold
27. This distribution is amplified for credit rationing by supply in
particular. The same is true of a stock market listing, though with a threshold of 2,000
employees, which confirms the theory that this threshold is a useful yardstick for the
probability of a firm being listed (Cieply, Paranque, 1996). For 57.6% of firms, at least 10%
of the capital was held by another company (legal entity) or the state, representing 83.2% of
all firms having financial links. The proportion was 38.6% for very small businesses, 52.8%
in the 20-100 employee range, 80.6% in the 100-500 range, 93.3% in the 500-2000 range and
96% for very large firms.
Among the firms having financial links, another firm or the state owned more than
10% of the capital of 97.8% of them (corresponding to 57.6% of all the firms in the sample);
more than 25% of the capital of 91.4% of them (corresponding to 53.7% of all the firms in the
sample); more than 50% of 78.9% of them (corresponding to 46.4% of all the firms in the
sample); and more than 95% of 53.3% of them (corresponding to 31.3% of all the firms in the
sample). Analysis by type of shareholder shows that at least 10% of the capital is held:
• in 0.1% of cases by the state,
                                                  
25 At September 1996, firms owned exclusively by individuals were not included. We are grateful to É. Kremp and
C. Truy for their help to use those informations.
26 By comparison with DAFSA data on financial links.
27 We have not considered the question of what, from an economic standpoint, constitutes a financial link. However,
the various hierarchies between financial links or stock market listing and size or credit status, or, for credit
rationing, between financial links or stock market listing and size, are borne out at the thresholds of 10%, 25%,
50% and 95% of the capital held by another legal entity or the state.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 20
• in 0.3% of cases by the employees (there were no differences according to size
category for this type of shareholder structure),
• in 0.8% of cases by the public (listed securities),
• in 11.1% of cases by a bank,
• in 27.3% of cases by a private individual,
• in 39.3% of cases by a holding company,
• in 54.5% of cases by another firm.
TYPE OF SHAREHOLDER BY SIZE










State 0,1 0 0 0 0,2 6,2
(375,653) (0,5657) (368,29)
Public (stock market) 0,8 0,2 0,4 1,0 3,3 8,3
(114,457) (4,9952) (9,3926) (1,0214) (34,422) (63,668)
Bank 11,1 9,2 11,1 12,8 1,1 11,3
(13,532) (3,2733) (0,0005) (4,9123) (3,8905) (0,0045)
Private individual 27,25 43,7 58,96 15,94 6,31 5,1
(449,479) (100,85) (35,256) (94,549) (78,794) (17,377)
Holding company 39,3 27,8 38,2 43,8 50,1 55,7
(110,490) (34,655) (1,1765) (10,158) (14,458) (6,5763)
Firm 54,5 65,1 54,2 51,3 50,9 43,3
(61,832) (20,696) (0,0892) (3,896) (1,1815) (2,247)
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises –  Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
* Chi-squared in brackets.
Within firms having less than 20 employees, the blocking minority most often belongs
to at least one private individual or firm. It is rare for such firms to be owned by a bank or a
holding company. The situation is symmetrical among firms with more than 100 employees.
Banks have shareholdings above all in companies with 100 to 500 employees. Beyond that
point, shares are mainly traded on stock markets. These findings contradict the generally
accepted parallel between a company’s size and its degree of independence and highlight a
difference in the type of control exercised over a firm according to the number of employees.
FINANCIAL LINKS, INSOLVENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING AND CREDIT RATING
1995
(*) 3 rating Insolvency
Fijanc` D 0_*Ðvàðä€￿6  (14.420/1.208)) 0.2 (5.982/1.837)
Listed 2.3  (15.061/4.3181) NA*
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
The figures in brackets are the chi-squared significant at the 5% threshold and the contribution to the sub-population
* not applicable.
The frequency of 3 ratings is higher than the average for the sample among firms
having financial links (likewise, the frequency of 4, 5 and 6 ratings is lower when at least 10%
of the capital is owned by another company or by the state) and/or listed on the stock market
(respectively 69.2% and 2%). This is doubtless due to the guarantor role that the firms having
the links may play, but is also attributable to the profitability imperative that direct contact
with the financial markets exerts on these firms’ approach to their financial situation
(Paranque, 1996), causing them to strengthen their financial independence. The incidence of
insolvency was less frequent in 1995 among firms having financial links than for the sample
as a whole.
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Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
* The figure in brackets is the chi-squared significant at the 5% threshold and the contribution to the sub-population
Interpretation:
§  65.6% of firms in the demand configuration have financial links / 42.9% of firms with financial links are in the demand
configuration; the corresponding figures for the sample as a whole are 69.2% and 45.2% respectively.
§  2.2% of firms in the supply configuration are listed on the stock exchange / 43.8% of listed firms are in the supply
confoguration; the corresponding figures for the sample as a whole are 2.0% and 39.9% respectively.
Firms in the credit rationing by supply configuration more often have financial links
(72.3% of cases) than do other firms (the contrary is less true), a finding that needs to be seen
in a group context, especially as regards prices between sister companies and cash
management. The existence of cross-guarantees also needs to be taken into account.
Listed firms are more frequently in equilibrium than other firms, which seems
consistent with our initial theoretical assumptions and strengthens the relevance of independent
assessment of credit status. Preserving the symmetry, firms in equilibrium are more often
listed than other firms. Firms in the demand configuration are less often listed.
Ultimately, the proportion of firms in the demand configuration is broadly higher. It
falls when financial links exist, the firms in this case tending to be in the supply configuration
or in equilibrium. This observed change doubtless corresponds to specific methods of
financing linked to the possible existence of special financial relations between linked firms.
Listed firms are broadly speaking in equilibrium.
5. CREDIT RATIONING IS APPLIED ABOVE ALL IN THE
SHORT TERM
In this section, we shall look in greater detail at the years 1994-1995 in the light of the
fragility of the recovery in investment. Financing requirements, substantial in the short term,
are linked above all to the financing of operations, while capital investment seems generally to
be financed from cash flow. In these circumstances, firms appear to be rationed in the short
term without commercial credit playing a substitution role. At the same time, the monetary
environment reflects agents’ uncertainty as to the stability of prevailing conditions for raising
capital rather than their inflationary expectations.
5.1 A firm’s working capital requirement determines its
demand for credit
Over the period 1985-1995, there is little correlation between differences in firms’
levels of activity and their credit configuration since there is no significant difference in the
rate of turnover variation between the three configurations we have identified.
Firms subject to credit rationing by supply have significantly higher debt rates than
firms in the demand configuration. Within each configuration, large firms have lower debt
rates than small businesses. Within the small business category, firms in the supply
configuration have higher debt rates than those in the other configurations. This distribution is
not found among large firms. However, three points need to be made:BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 22
– first, the debt rate excluding bank overdrafts (ie, the long-term debt rate) is less high
in the first case than in the second,
– second, the proportion of bank loans in total debt is higher for firms in the demand
configuration, while the proportion of bank overdrafts is higher for firms in the supply
configuration;
– third, the average cost of debt, calculated as the ratio of interest charges to financial
debt, is lower for firms in the demand configuration than for firms in the supply configuration,
except in 1985 and 1995 when it was similar.
There does not appear to be any stable link between credit configuration and the
overnight rate or spread
28.
Two other points are worth noting:
– the proportion of debt securities in total debt was higher among firms in equilibrium
than in firms in the demand configuration, though there was no difference between firms in the
demand configuration and firms in the supply configuration;
– there was no difference in the level of participating loans across the three
configurations.
The low level of financial autonomy of firms subject to credit rationing may be caused
by a lack of equity, but the link between high debt levels and low equity levels is difficult to
pin down. The link may reflect high profitability coinciding with sustained investment in the
productive potential. This is generally the case among small businesses compared with large
firms (Paranque, 1994, 1996) and low equity levels reflect a hierarchy in the sources of
financing: cash flow, debt, equity.
With regard to credit configuration, the situation appears to differ from that which is
found when the size criterion is applied. Whatever the indicator used, profitability is lower
among firms subject to credit rationing by supply than in the other cases. At the same time,
the strict accumulation rate of companies in the supply configuration is significantly lower
than that of firms in the demand configuration
29 (there is a 6-point gap). This finding suggests
that lenders’ supply of credit is rationed by firms which initially finance their investment out
of cash flow. It would confirm two points: first, the short-term/long-term dichotomy between
configurations as regards debt rates; and second, the relevance of the theory outlined in the
introduction that firms, lacking prospects and in a tight financial environment, have
internalised the constraints of their financial partners and submit only vital and profitable
investment projects
30 for which they are almost certain to obtain financing.
The observed short-term/long-term dichotomy reflects the existence of mainly short-
term financing needs. True of firms subject to credit rationing by supply in 1995, it seems to
be a stable feature. This characteristic of firms according to the term of debt seems to be
                                                  
28 The overnight rate is sometimes higher in the credit rationing configuration than in the case of unrestricted access to
credit, during phases of expansion or contraction (1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994), and sometimes lower, during
cyclical upturns or downturns (1987, 1990, 1992, 1995), except in 1985 and 1989 when it was similar in both
cases.
In 1985 and 1986 the spread was negative, but more so in the case of unrestricted access to credit than in the case of
credit rationing. From 1987 to 1989, then in 1991 and 1995, there was no significant difference. When the spread
was positive, it was greater for companies subject to credit rationing in 1992 even though it was narrower than for
companies with unrestricted access to credit in 1993. In 1990 it was negative and narrower for firms subject to
credit rationing, unlike in 1994 when it was greatest.
29 From 1989 to 1995, the extended accumulation rate (total investment plus changes in working capital requirement
to invested capital) was lower under credit rationing conditions. This finding can be explained by a lower level of
investment in the productive potential that is either compounded by a negative variation in the working capital
requirement or that more than offsets an increase in the working capital requirement.
30 This finding may also correspond to hierarchical financing.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 23
relatively clear-cut, since of the firms continuously subject to credit rationing since 1989, less
than a fifth are rationed in both the medium and the long term (cf. above).
A firm’s credit configuration seems to be influenced by the nature of the link with the
economic and financial environment, reflecting situations of dependency or domination
between firms. Thus, taking the overall debt rate, rationing is applied to the short-term
financing resulting from the working capital requirements of firms in the supply configuration,
which are greater than those of other firms. The period covered by the working capital
requirement is greater for firms in the supply configuration (80.4 days) than for other firms
(68.8 days for firms in equilibrium and 61.3 days for firms in the demand configuration). A
closer look at one element of the working capital requirement shows that the level of
intercompany credit
31 is higher for firms rationed by supply (10.2 days) than for firms in
equilibrium (9.1 days) or firms in the demand configuration (9.5 days). This gap is not due to
some assumed substitution (or supplementing) of financial debt by supplier credit. Payment
times for trade payables are similar across the three configurations. By contrast, customer
payment times are 83.6 days for firms subject to credit rationing and approx. 80 days in other
cases. Likewise, for 16% of firms in the supply configuration in both 1994 and 1995 there
was no difference in the level of intercompany credit or its components compared with
companies in the other two configurations. A substitution effect might have been expected,
whereby a reduction in the debt rate would allow firms to move from one configuration to
another ajd hejce be maTched by a rise in the level of commercial credit, but this was not the
case.
On the contrary, the firms which from the lenders’ standpoint have a maximum debt
level are those which finance their customers the most. Consequently, credit rationing by
supply also reflects an economic constraint linked to the nature of relations with customers
and the degree of dependence on them. This indicates a relationship of domination reinforced
by low stock turnover, which is 64.2 days for firms in the supply configuration compared with
57.4 days for firms in equilibrium and 49.2 days for firms in the demand configuration.
Analysis by size shows that in conditions of credit rationing by supply the level of
intercompany credit is higher among firms with 20 - 500 employees and similar among other
firms. It is apparent initially that large firms benefit from this form of financing (CNC, 1996)
and that consequently there is no effect of substitution for bank credit for small firms that
carry higher levels of debt. Closer examination of the components of this balance shows first,
that customer payment times are shorter among firms with over 500 employees than among
smaller firms, and second that supplier payment times are longer among small businesses (less
than 100 employees) than among other firms. The latter finding suggests that longer supplier
payment times are a supplementary source of financing for very small businesses which are
more often subject to credit rationing. However, such an analysis must be treated with caution,
because the finding may also reflect specific business factors linked to longer production
cycles, as in the case of one-off orders for particular products, for example (Salais and
Storper, 1993).
CREDIT RATIONING BY SUPPLY IN 1995 IN RELATION TO CREDIT RATIONING BY DEMAND
Days £ 20 21–100 101–500 501–2 000 > 2 000
Customer lags < > > NS NS
Supplier lags NS* NS > NS NS
Intercompany credit < > > NS NS
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update November 1996
* difference is not significant
                                                  
31 Including downpayments from clients and to suppliers.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 24
To gain a fuller understanding of financing methods, we would have to be able to
reconstitute the commercial links between firms in order to determine, for a given firm subject
to credit rationing, the credit configuration of its clients. If its clients proved to be in the
demand or equilibrium configuration, this would support the hypothesis of a substitution
effect between financing methods. Such support is not forthcoming at the moment, for lack of
information.
5.2 Are firms more sensitive to changes in rates than to
changes in spreads?
Before comparing the credit configuration with changes in interest rates, let us
recapitulate the main features of the period under review, which followed a series of reforms
that profoundly changed France’s financial landscape.
1983 : Opening up of firms’ investment possibilities: bonds with share options,
investment certificates, participating shares, creation of a second stock
market accessible to small firms.
1984 : Abolition of credit restrictions and new Banking Act giving banks greater
freedom of action.
1985 : Creation of certificates of deposit, negotiable debt securities open to banks,
followed by commercial paper and other negotiable instruments.
1985 : Creation of a financial futures market (MATIF).
1986 : Relaxation of exchange controls
32.
Three main sub-periods can be identified:
– 1985 to 1989: a period of recovery and economic growth. The financial reforms of
1984-86 had a considerable impact on financing methods, especially for large firms. However,
the fragility of the financial system was highlighted by the crash of October 1987, the effects
of which are still being felt;
– 1990 to 1993: a period of slowdown and recession, hitting small businesses first
(bankruptcies reached record levels), though large firms and the banking system were also
affected;
– since 1994: despite considerable public assistance the recovery has been timid and
hesitant, with low levels of investment reflecting a broader uncertainty about economic and
monetary prospects.
During these years, financial deregulation and fresh growth suggested a lasting
recovery made possible by a better allocation of resources, better possibilities for risk
management and a greater variety of financing methods (Aglietta, 1995). However, high real
interest rates until 1990, financial crisis (the 1987 crash, the peso crisis in 1994) and the
bankruptcy or quasi-bankruptcy of some large groups (eg, Metallgesellschaft in 1994), the
property crisis and the difficulties of French banks all led to increased short-term pressures
and tighter solvency requirements. Against this background, despite lower real interest rates,
banks and consequently firms as well developed two priorities: financial consolidation and
short-term profitability (Léonard, 1997). This had two consequences: the postponement or
shelving of investment projects, and a drop in the accumulation rate, thus ensuring the
profitability of invested capital. The combination of these factors led to a fall in investment
and a rise in internal financing from 1991 (Aglietta, 1995). Under these circumstances, a
firm’s credit configuration may be assumed to express a different state of affairs depending on
                                                  
32 Taken from Jullien, Paranque (1995).BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 25
whether it is identified before or after 1990/91. In the first case, lenders chose only those
investments whose profitability was compatible with real interest rates (ie, with long-term
inflationary expectations). In the second case, lenders gave priority to investments that were
profitable in the short term.
The monetary environment is materialised by the interest rate spread
33. Until mid-
































































































































































































Source and chart: Banque de France – Banque des séries monétaires et économiques
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update January 1997
                                                  
33 Average overnight rate to average rate for 10-year government bonds.BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 26











































































































































































































































Source and chart:  Banque de France - Banque des séries monétaires et économiques
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update January 1997
TJJ = Overnight rate
TMO = 10-year government bond rate








1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
TAJJ-TAO GDP
Source and chart: Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update July 1996
A comparison of spreads with changes in GDP
34 shows a symmetry which is
contradicted only in 1988, 1989 and 1990, when markets were uncertain about future growth
trends. The interest spread reached its maximum positive level in 1993 with the recession.
Five points should be noted:
                                                  
34 which is well reflected in the samples (see description in Annex 1).BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 27
–  the fall in interest rates between 1985 and 1987 was matched by an increase in the
proportion of firms subject to credit rationing;
– between 1989 and 1991, the rise in rates and the inversion of the trend match a
decline in the number of firms subject to credit rationing and an increase in the number of
firms in the demand configuration;
– from 1993 to 1994, the fall in interest rates coincides with a stabilisation of the
number of firms in the demand configuration and an increase in the number of firms in the
supply configuration;
– in 1995, despite the fact that the spread is again negative, interest rate changes are
matched by a decline both in the number of firms in the demand and supply configurations and
an increase in the number of firms in equilibrium;
– focusing on the long-term debt rate, as expected the proportion of firms in the
demand configuration increases from 1989, at the beginning of a period of high uncertainty, as
reflected by the positive interest rate spread. The proportion does not begin to decrease again
until 1995, matched by a corresponding in increase in the proportion of firms in equilibrium.
It would appear from this that firms are more sensitive to the direction of interest rate
trends than to whether the spread is positive or negative and the degree of uncertainty it is
supposed to reflect. In 1985-1987 and 1993-1995 interest rates fell and the proportion of
firms in the supply configuration increased. The same movement was observed with a negative
spread in one case and a positive spread in the other. The fact that credit configuration does
not depend on whether the spread is positive or negative may be linked to the varying
importance of uncertainty about the ability to control the solvency constraint. From a
macroeconomic standpoint, the rise in long rates and/or a negative spread express the
expectation that inflation will rise, and hence a situation that is favourable to borrowers. From
the firm’s standpoint, however, the rise might be thought to indicate an expectation of greater
difficulties in meeting financing requirements at lower cost (compounded by a positive spread)
and hence a risk of insolvency. This would suggest a certain mismatch between market
expectations and firms’ investment decisions, with firms finding themselves facing the dual
difficulty of determining real demand at a time of market uncertainty about future yields,
which strengthens the trend towards short-term profitability as a criterion for granting loans
35.
Altogether, there seems to be a link between credit configuration and the monetary
environment. Which one influences which remains to be determined, and this causal link will
be the subject of further research.
CONCLUSION
An earlier study (Cieply, Paranque, 1996) revealed the existence of a size effect in the
determination of the financial structures of French firms over the period 1990-1993. However,
this effect only appeared clearly above the 2000 employee threshold and was not sufficient to
identify the dominant factors explaining the financial structures observed.
We therefore turned to a model that included the determinants of the demand for and
supply of financial debt. The main findings of this research are:
– the importance of credit rationing by demand over the period as a whole and across
the population of firms;
                                                  
35 “Uncertainty as to yields coupled with the long end of the term structure tend formally to create, through the action
of futures and interest rate options in particular, a short-term horizon for reversible commitments, at which point
criteria of short-term profitability apply. [...] Thus, the higher a firm’s debt to equity ratio, the higher the required
yield on shares and the higher the overall cost of capital. In other words, variations in the financial markets’
assessment of shares and debt securities have a direct impact on the required yield on shares and on the overall cost
of capital” (Léonard, 1995).BANQUE DE FRANCE - GATE CNRS 28
– the absence of any effect of substitution of debt to suppliers for debt to financial
institutions, perhaps due to a lack of information about the customers of firms subject to credit
rationing by supply;
– the high frequency of firms with financial links subject to credit rationing by supply,
which doubtless corresponds to specific methods for managing cash balances and the
production cycle;
– the fact that listed firms are more often in equilibrium than other firms.
The hypothesis of a small business capital gap seems verified for the smallest
businesses, especially as regards long-term debt. However, this finding is not entirely clear-
cut. We have sought here to construct notional supply of and demand for credit. We have no
information about either lenders’ offer of credit to firms, or about firms’ real demand for
credit. It may be that the real values are in fact different from the notional values. Firms may
ration themselves in view of their own expectations of growth on their markets and their
perception of the financial and monetary environment. They may already have screened their
investment projects and defined a strategy likely to allow them to assume the solvency
constraint and meet the standards of financial independence.
Lastly, the prevalence of each configuration seems to depend more on the movement of
interest rates than on their spread.
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THE SAMPLE
11 samples spanning two years were constituted from 1985 to 1995. Only results for
year n were used, year n-1 being used to calculate variations.
The coverage rate (TC), calculated in relation to the number of salaried employees
appearing in the comprehensive register of firms taxable on trading profits, was stable over
the period, as was the structure of the sample (S). Small businesses were under-represented in
relation to their real weight in the economy.
percentage
% of 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Employees TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S TC S
ALL 47,8 100,0 51,1 100,0 52,7 100,0 55,6 100,0 55,3 100,0 54,4 100,0 57,9 100,0 56,5 100,0 51,1 100,0 54,3 100,0 NA 100,0
Firms with more
than 500
employees 68,9 70,8 70,4 65,3 73,0 63,3 75,4 61,3 74,0 59,0 71,4 57,5 78,4 57,5 76,4 56,8 75,9 57,1 72,5 53,4 NA 54,3
Comprehensive
sample - 49,3 47,0 - 45,7 - 45,2 - 44,1 - 43,8 - 42,3 - 42,0 - 41,4 - 40,5 - NA
Sources and table Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises  - Tel. : 01 42 92 56 58 Last update February 1997
TC : coverage rate; S : structure, NA : not available
COMPARISON OF THE RATE OF VARIATION OF GDP AND
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Source and chart : Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises  - Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October  1996
The variation in value added, calculated for each sample, follows the trend in GDP,
though it is amplified during periods of trend reversal. The recovery in 1987 in particular
shows up across the sample with a one-year lag.
The sample includes firms tracked by the Balance Sheet Data Centre for at least two
consecutive years. The firms are drawn from manufacturing industry including farming and
agribusiness. The sample was segmented according to the number of salaried employees.
Ultimately, only segmentations into 4 and 5 classes of size were used. The threshold of 500
employees to distinguish between SMBs and large firms is insufficient, as earlier research hasANNEX 1
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shown. The thresholds are therefore: less than 20 employees and/or 20 - 100 employees, 100 -
500 employees, 500 - 2000 employees, and over 2000 employees.
The data were initially checked to eliminate data entry errors. Firms with negative
output, payroll, balance sheet total, plant and equipment or employers’ contributions were
then stripped out. Firms with negative or zero invested capital were also removed.
The distribution of each ratio was then checked so as to identify and adjust extreme
values. These values were reduced to a limit defined ratio by ratio over the entire sample
1989-1993. The purpose of this work was to preserve the maximum amount of information on
the specific cases that these extreme, though not aberrant, values might represent.
Likewise, we verified cases where the numerator and denominator were
simultaneously negative. In such a case, the arithmetical properties affect the sign and the
economic correlation of the ratio with the ratios that have the same variable as their numerator
or denominator. Certain ratios for which the denominator or numerator were negative were
also adjusted. For arithmetical reasons, a negative individual ratio, by the action of its
denominator, will exert a downward influence on the sample average in the same way as
another whose numerator is low in relation to the denominator. From an economic standpoint,
however, the nature of the firm’s situation is different. For example, the ratio of interest
charges to total gross operating profit may be negative because of its denominator, and
therefore reduce the average and hence the amplitude of the solvency constraint in the same
way as a firm with low interest charges and high total gross operating profit. In order to avoid
this situation, the upper value of the limit mentioned earlier is assigned to a firm with a
negative denominator for the ratio in question.ANNEX 2
35
REGRESSION ON THE DEMAND VECTOR 
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Coefficient (F *) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,1563 0,1814 0,1863 0,1458 0,199 0,1803
(220,61) (374,86) (402,72) (308,71) (571,30) (528,18)
BM4 Working capital requirement / NS 0,0178 NS 0,0853 NS 0,0621
invested capital (4,75) (41,44) (29,20)
BB11 Net self-financing capacity / -0,0301 -0,0437 -0,0545 -0,0519 -0,0412 -0,0363
shareholders’ equity (67,94) (168,28) (233,76) (199,09) (141,17) (122,40)
BM7 Plant and equipment / NS NS 0,0591 0,1451 0,0941 0,1373
invested capital (51,03) (125,4) (140,41) (146,44)
BB5 Extended accumulation -0,3664 -0,3307 -0,361 -0,3203 -0,3688 -0,3206
rate (2 297,58) (2 045,24) (2 708,23) (1 469,28) (3 017,18) (1 963,89)
BT2 Average cost -0,4657 -0,5138 -0,5234 -0,5386 -0,5385 -0,524
of debt (643,31) (842,72) (828,25) (798,24) (859,59) (972,77)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / NS NS 0,196 0,2785 -0,4758 0,2086
invested capital (11,14) (20,72) (94,71) (18,82)
BM11 Interest charges / 0,0174 0,0198 0,0093 0,0233 0,027 0,0212
overall cash flow (51,28) (78,39) (16,81) (88,73) (131,98) (96,64)
BB12 Dividends / -0,3247 -0,2773 -0,2519 -0,1202 -0,1763 -0,1787
shareholders’ equity (68,95) (62,38) (76,74) (20,91) (58,64) (77,64)
ECTAUX Interest rate spread 7,4007 NS NS 2,0012 NS NS
(4,25) (8,78)
Constant 51,4579 37,2969 35,6208 30,4976 33,3103 29,4242
(59,35) (6 455,24) (4 094,87) (377,35) (3 673,65) (812,10)
Number of observations 6 394 8 178 9 063 10 170 11 166 11 928
Adjusted R² 0,4013 0,3855 0,3647 0,3339 0,3590 0,3337
Coefficient (F *) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,1655 0,1706 0,1609 0,1161 0,1278
(441,41) (406,93) (394,44) (284,69) (296,28)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,07 0,0308 NS -0,1355 -0,1283
invested capital (38,48) (6,68) (1 283,29) (703,17)
BB11 Net self-financing capacity / -0,0414 -0,0364 -0,0471 -0,0455 -0,311
shareholders’ equity (189,73) (151,74) (312,67) (263,10) (118,27)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,1719 0,1506 0,0571 NS NS
invested capital (251,91) (181,41) (72,09)
BB5 Extended accumulation -0,3224 -0,3597 -0,3541 -0,3617 -0,3421
rate (2 048,89) (2 330,21) (3 737,86) (3 584,08) (3 070,2)
BT2 Average cost -0,5017 -0,5007 -0,4747 -0,4576 -0,4265
of debt (1 055,47) (968,33) (1 155,76) (1 193,22) (1 155,34)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / 0,1473 0,4254 0,1759 NS NS
invested capital (9,36) (93,79) (23,16)
BM11 Interest charges / 0,0152 0,0121 NS 0,0062 0,0065
overall cash flow (61,82) (45,21) (15,01) (16,03)
BB12 Dividends / -0,1424 -0,1085 -0,1418 -0,159 -0,1540
shareholders’ equity (52,18) (28,93) (68,95) (94,94) (97,37)
ECTAUX Interest rate spread NS NS NS 0,9927 -3,968
(9,59) (14,85)
Constant 25,9386 26,7822 30,6345 36,671 28,773
(718,71) (710,99) (4 585,36) (4 455,76) (433,96)
Number of observations 12 893 12 099 13 496 12 190
Adjsuted R² 0,3475 0,3498 0,3634 0,3275
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update October 1996
* significantly different from zero at the 5% threshold
                                                  
36 We have used the PROC REG procedure available under SAS and evaluate this quality using adjusted R-squared.
Multicolinearity and homoskedasticity are tested using the SPEC, VIF and COLLINOINT options.ANNEX 2
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REGRESSION ON THE SUPPLY VECTOR
Coefficient (F *) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,0648 0,0905 0,088 0,0643 0,1095 0,1051
(34,98) (84,33) (79,39) (55,45) (159,07) (169,44)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,3221 0,2706 0,3186 0,3463 0,3418 0,3384
invested capital (573,53) (562,57) (662,13) (814,20) (906,49) (1 009,54)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,1943 0,134 0,2437 0,3005 0,3113 0,31
invested capital (172,12) (112,10) (325,41) (520,42) (622,54) (720,42)
BB12 Dividends / -0,3232 0,3588 -0,2779 -0,1437 -0,1520 -0,1316
shareholders’ equity (62,49) (97,63) (83,31) (28,66) (41,0) (39,86)
BB10 Self-financing / 0,1688 0,1409 0,1108 0,1876 0,2008 0,167
internal financing (185,62) (155,05) (90,25) (259,48) (339,12) (1 444,19)
BT4 Group and shareholder loans / -0,2939 -0,2991 -0,2821 -0,2732 -0,2787 -0,2863
external financing (928,67) (1 319,01) (1 092,83) (1 037,50) (1 220,89) (1 444,19)
BJ3 Participating interests / 0,1148 NS 0,2109 0,147 0,2756 0,2671
invested capital (7,5) (34,84) (19,33) (88,77) (105,54)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / -0,2174 NS NS 0,2278 -0,6402 NS
invested capital (13,02) (13,36) (164,74)
BB7 Debt burden 0,0527 0,0523 0,0466 0,0595 0,064 0,055
(945,99) (1 110,04) (844,52) (1 330,65) (1 680,09) (1 444,73)
BT2 Average cost -0,2492 -0,288 -0,3133 -0,3268 -0,2846 -0,2481
of debt (160,80) (247,37) (241,85) (272,84) (217,82) (200,72)
TAJJ Overnight rate NS NS -7,8118 6,9068 NS -4,073
(20,07) (25,65) (5,75)
Constant 12,0029 17,335 71,6162 -49,056 NS 42,7746
(84,45) (263,29) (26,7) (22,24) (6,4)
Number of observations 6 394 8 178 9 064 10 170 11 166 11 929
Adjusted R² 0,3557 0,3448 0,3033 0,3137 0,3317 0,3177
Coefficient (F *) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,1079 0,127 0,1023 0,0745 0,0751
(173,96) (200,04) (131,04) (99,36) (92,45)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,3512 0,3693 0,2862 NS 0,0425
invested capital (1 025,13) (1 052,10) (711,57) (26,5)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,3546 0,4102 0,2802 0,1723 0,1583
invested capital (1 004,83) (1 291,81) (668,35) (1 134,35) (272,06)
BB12 Dividends / -0,1127 -0,1057 -0,1351 -0,199 -0,120
shareholders’ equity (30,20) (24,52) (52,39) (123,50) (51,35)
BB10 Self-financing / 0,1242 0,1069 0,1188 0,0735 0,157
internal financing (157,35) (108,04) (134,51) (53,32) (256,68)
BT4 Group and shareholder loans / -0,2585 -0,2527 -0,2124 -0,2003 -0,1971
external financing (1 312,96) (998,57) (985,18) (993,76) (1 098,11)
BJ3 Participating interests / 0,2336 0,356 0,2297 0,1015 0,0608
invested capital (92,52) (203,45) (93,92) (23,44) (7,15)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / NS 0,3679 0,1282 NS NS
invested capital (63,68) (10,74)
BB7 Debt burden 0,0465 0,0418 0,034 0,0347 0,038
(1 204,81) (1 046,81) (871,62) (878,72) (1 089,23)
BT2 Average cost -0,2798 -0,2979 -0,2942 -0,332 -0,2913
of debt (294,33) (299,11) (369,51) (511,28) (466,96)
TAJJ Overnight rate 11,0312 NS NS 3,8834 -3,332
(12,82) (21,56) (11,85)
Constant -104,989 -4,8251 3,8564 NS 35,353
(12,77) (23,26) (16,81) (33,25)
Number of observations 12,596 12 893 12 099 13 496 12 191
Adjusted R² 0,3053 0,2891 0,2667 0,2625 0,2681
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92  56 58 Last update October 1996
* significantly different from zero at the 5% thresholdANNEX 3
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Coefficient (a) (standard dev.) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,175 0,178 0,158 0,2096 0,2146 0,2045
(0,018) (0,015) (0,0138) (0,013) (0,0122) (0,012)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,15 0,1581 0,1789 0,2418 0,1179 0,1732
invested capital (0,028) (0,022) (0,0215) (0,0207) (0,0198) (0,0184)
BB11 Net self-financing capacity / NS NS NS -0,0198 -0,0079**** -0,007****
shareholders’ equity (0,0057) (0,0054) (0,0052)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,1127 0,1494 0,2026 0,264 0,1886 0,2478
invested capital (0,0264) (0,0240) (0,0188) (0,0193) (0,018) (0,0167)
BB5 Extended accumulation -0,1643 -0,1464 -0,1476 -0,1329 -0,208 -0,1362
rate (0,0194) (0,0157) (0,0151) (0,0149) (0,0144) (0,0134)
BT2 Average cost -0,4723 -0,5078 -0,5385 -0,5941 -0,6167 -0,5809
of debt (0,0266) (0,025) (0,0245) (0,0254) (0,0242) (0,022)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / NS NS 0,46 0,2421** 0,3857 0,3639
invested capital (0,097) (0,0946) (0,0889) (0,08)
BM11 Interest charges / 0,024 0,0263 0,0188 0,0275 0,0206 0,0264
overall cash flow (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,0028) (0,0026)
BB12 Dividends / -0,56 -0,492 -0,3768 -0,2643 -0,1948 -0,1475
shareholders’ equity (0,0729) (0,065) (0,046) (0,0411) (0,0352) (0,029)
ECTAUX Interest rate spread 7,7779**** -2,915*** NS NS -1,477**** 3,154**
(5,9253) (1,6279) (1,1066) (1,3175)
Constant 40,83 20,875 20,7117 15,7322 25,6592 19,7096
(11,494) (2,6472) (1,8586) (1,8941) (1,8535) (1,7096)
Number of observations 2 795 3 666 3 982 4 336 5 002 5 392
Adjusted R² 0,2703 0,2447 0,2588 0,2897 0,2803 0,2707
F 130,374 149,407 174,731 197,443 195,768 201,129
Coefficient (a) (standard dev.) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,1672 0,1747 0,1601 0,1129 0,1328
(0,0119) (0,0118) (0,0108) (0,0092) (0,011)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,212 0,1825 0,1563 0,1671 0,1591
invested capital (0,0175) (0,0178) (0,016) (0,014) (0,0158)
BB11 Net self-financing capacity / -0,0123** -0,0139 NS NS -0,01**
shareholders’ equity (0,0040)) (0,0048) (0,0045)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,3056 0,3047 0,2095 0,2404 0,22
invested capital (0,0159) (0,016) (0,015) (0,0138) (0,0155)
BB5 Extended accumulation -0,115 -0,096 -0,0938 -0,0179**** -0,09
rate (0,0128) (0,013) (0,0126) (0,0123) (0,0134)
BT2 Average cost -0,5162 -0,47 -0,4553 -0,411 -0,425
of debt (0,0197) (0,02) (0,0171) (0,0162) (0,0169)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / 0,2826 0,28 0,2992 0,044*** 0,1465**
invested capital (0,0797) (0,0674) (0,0559) (0,0256) (0,0643)
BM11 Interest charges / 0,0258 0,0215 0,0152 0,0222 0,013
overall cash flow (0,0023) (0,0021) (0,0017) (0,0017) (0,002)
BB12 Dividends / -0,1706 -0,11 -0,128 -0,1332 -0,136
shareholders’ equity (0,0297) (0,0298) (0,024) (0,0223) (0,0229)
ECTAUX Interest rate spread -1,3377**** -1,3198*** NS 0,836** -3,7716
(0,907) (0,689) (0,3714) (1,4)
Constant 12,9279 12,0788 14,0728 7,8432 5,9817**
(1,5875) ((1,9237) (1,4198) (1,421) (2,353)
Number of observations 5 770 5 963 5 717 6 284 5 515
Adjusted R² 0,274 0,2443 0,247 0,2199 0,23
F 218,707 192,706 235,428 197,753 165,638
Source and table:  Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92 56 58 Last update December 1996
(a) significant at the 1% threshold except where specified: **  significant at the 5% threshold
*** significant at the 10% threshold    **** significant at the 20% threshold
                                                  
37 The low value of the adjusted R-squared in relation to the value obtained for all firms is doubtless attributable to the
firms assigned equilibrium status because of a non-significant difference between estimates of the optimal debt rate
and maximum debt rate and because of the difficulty of identifying an optimal rate from accounting data only
without qualitative information concerning entrepreneurs’ expecations, for example.ANNEX 3
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Coefficient (a) (standard dev.) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,035** 0,044 0,0466 NS 0,0817 0,0526
(0,0151) (0,0138) (0,016) (0,01329) (0,0120)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,2653 0,1251 0,2146 0,2253 0,217 0,1925
invested capital (0,0187) (0,0181) (0,0198) (0,0198) (0,0174) (0,0172)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,1667 -0,0312**** 0,1243 0,1772 0,109 0,1234
invested capital (0,02) (0,02) (0,0223) (0,023) (0,0196) (0,0188)8)
BB12 Dividends / -0,143** -0,1114** -0,0863*** NS -0,1384 -0,1433
shareholders’ equity (0,0633) (0,0477) (0,4964) (0,0382) (0,0341)
BB10 Self-financing / 0,1571 0,130 0,101 0,1149 0,0596 0,0486
internal financing (0,0171) (0,0146) (0,0166) (0,0189) (0,0162) (0,0153)
BT4 Group and shareholder loans / -0,4447 -0,481 -0,4469 -0,4224 -0,4093 -0,4408
external financing (0,0116) (0,0096) (0,0116) (0,0118) (0,0102) (0,01)
BJ3 Participating interests / 0,0897**** -0,2032 0,1911 NS 0,092** 0,090***
invested capital (0,0567) (0,044) (0,0568) (0,0453) (0,05)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / -0,2711 NS NS 0,9679 -1,5418 NS
invested capital (0,0933) (0,1337) (0,0768)
BB7 Debt burden 0,0787 0,0744 0,0777 0,0842 0,0872 0,0704
(0,0031) (0,0026) (0,0031) (0,0035) (0,003) (0,003)
BT2 Average cost -0,092 -0,0955 -0,1495 -0,1554 -0,0391**** -0,0405****
of debt (0,03) (0,0257) (0,0332) (0,0339) (003102) (0,0285)
TAJJ Overnight rate NS NS -13,6597 11,6264 NS -9,792
(3,2142) (2,7373) (2,9742)
Constant 32,1078 48,7829 132,6856 -68,5562 21,4785 120,8807
(10,8619) (11,0279) (25,5214) (20,7365) (1,715) (29,6529)
Number of observations 2 440 3 245 3 601 3 951 4 456 4 597
Adjsuted R² 0,5671 0,5836 0,4651 0,4247 0,4868 0,4558
F 291,5 455,581 314,08 365,545 423,607 385,867
Coefficient (a) (standard dev.) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
BM1 Turnover variation rate 0,0709 0,0856 0,0668 0,0535 0,0373
(0,0137) (0,016) (0,0146) (0,0126) (0,0124)
BM4 Working capital requirement / 0,261 0,3083 0,1774 -0,1431 -0,1374
invested capital (0,0184) (0,0202) (0,0172) (0,0123) (0,0061)
BM7 Plant and equipment / 0,274 0,3571 0,147 0,0259**** NS
invested capital (0,0197) (0,0199) (0,0177) (0,0173)
BB12 Dividends / -0,0936** -0,0996 -0,1095 -0,2186 -0,069**
shareholders’ equity (0,037) (0,0378) (0,0302) (0,0293) (0,0268)
BB10 Self-financing / 0,045 0,0786 0,0917 0,0208**** 0,108
internal financing (0,0155) (0,061) (0,0144) (0,0293) (0,0144)
BT4 Group and shareholder loans / -0,4248 -0,3905 -0,3928 -0,4 -0,3693
external financing (0,0103) (0,0197) (0,0093) (0,009) (0,008)
BJ3 Participating interests / 0,1934 0,2748 0,052**** -0,1211 -0,1683
invested capital (0,0486) (0,0567) (0,0396) (0,0365) (0,0282)
BJ4 Net increase in capital / NS 1,1067 0,1565** -0,0973**** NS
invested capital (0,1022) (0,064) (0,0677)
BB7 Debt burden 0,0569 0,0623 0,0503 0,0445 0,0511
(0,0027) (0,0027) (0,0022) (0,0023) (0,0024)
BT2 Average cost -0,0415**** -0,184 -0,1574 -0,1776 -0,1118
of debt (0,0289) (0,0325) (0,0254) (0,0248) (0,0219)
TAJJ Overnight rate 19,3445 NS NS 7,2655 -4,577**
(5,8105) (1,4926) (1,963)
Constant -170,4337 7,1016 22,5232 NS 66,1728
(55,3408) (1,8053 (1,5794) (12,3939)
Number of observations 4 868 4 927 4 696 5 484 4 869
Adjusted R² 0,4145 0,416 0,4318 0,451 0,467
F 345,498 351,852 357,829 410,457 474,964
Source and table: Banque de France
Observatoire des entreprises – Tel.: 01 42 92  56 58 Last update December 1996
(a) significant at the 1% threshold except where specified: **  significant at the 5% threshold
*** significant at the 10% threshold    **** significant at the 20% threshold